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1. Introduction 
When people talk about an object in their environment, they have recourse not to scientific 
language, but to evaluative language. This evaluative language allows them to say what one 
does, can do or must do with that object (i.e., its functional or social value). For instance, 
when Mrs Smith talks about an orchid that someone has given her, she says, It's so delicate 
and refined! Its flowers come in fantastic shapes and yet it’s really easy to grow. When she talks 
about the meat she is cooking for dinner, she says, It's tender, juicy, and smells good. 
Statements like these make sense, but not scientific sense. These words are not the words of a 
botanist or a physiologist. This is a language used to say what one does, can do or must do 
with a flower or a cut of meat, something that is never expressed in descriptive or scientific 
language. A botanist might say, for example, that an orchid has three colorful sepals and 
three petals, that two of the petals are underdeveloped, that the third, on the contrary, is 
highly developed and forms the labellum, and so on. A physiologist might say that muscle 
is made up of thousands of cylindrical cells called muscle fibers, that each fiber is enveloped 
and separated from the others by a thin layer of connective tissue - the endomysium -, and 
so on. Curiously, though, when Mrs Smith talks about her friends or neighbors, many social 
psychologists opine that the words she uses to describe those friends and neighbors are 
more like the descriptive or scientific words of the botanist or physiologist than the 
evaluative words she uses to talk about meat or flowers.  
1.1 Memories of the 1950s 
This curious phenomenon has a long history. In his famous book on interpersonal relations, 
Heider (1958) stated that (1) naive psychology should be a key topic of psychosocial 
research, and that (2) people resemble professional scientists in their daily lives. More 
specifically, when attempting to understand either other people or themselves, they operate 
as intuitive scientists. The theorists of the causal attribution will attempt to exemplify this 
postulate which poses man as a scientist. Heider’s view rested on a continuist epistemology, 
in that he assumed that a continuity exists between the commonsense way of thinking and 
scientific reasoning, the only difference being that scientists devote more resources to 
meeting their knowledge goals. These ideas were very much of their day, for in the 1950s, 
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theorists felt it was important to reinstate human rationality in the social sciences, after 
decades of psychoanalysis and psychology of affects and motivations. However, such was 
their overpowering influence on social psychology throughout the second half of the 
twentieth century that we can legitimately ask whether they did not do more harm than 
good. These ideas led social psychologists to forget that human beings essentially are 
evaluative creatures (Kluckhohn, 1954). And yet, it can be argued that the approach that 
people have to objects (animate or inanimate) traditionally called “objects of knowledge” 
prevents them from knowing what those objects are from a descriptive point of view. 
Instead, it allows them to decide what one can or should do with them (Can I get involved in 
this project with him?) or what one can make them do (Can I persuade this pupil to embark on a 
lengthy course of study?). In other words, it allows them to evaluate the objects (Beauvois & 
Dubois, 2000, 2009). Thus, instead of being “objects of knowledge”, objects are actually 
“objects of evaluation” to people. This conception rests on a different, noncontinuist 
epistemology, wherein science can only flourish if it breaks away from common sense 
(Bachelard, 1938, 1953). The fact of seeing the science everywhere in the thought and in the 
judgment is linked to a dichotomous conception according to which the science opposes to 
the error, maybe to the madness. A noncontinuist position moves forward that the science is 
only one of the possible modes of knowledge of the objects which do not have all the 
rationality of the science. Common sense is certainly not irrational, but its rationality is 
different from that of science. Common sense cannot be judged on the criterion of truth 
value, but it can be judged on the criterion of social acceptability. The common sense’s 
statements must be acceptable (versus unacceptable) by people rather than be true (versus 
false). This is the case when we use naive psychology and, in particular, personality traits to 
understand the people with whom we have dealings. In this conception, traits are regarded 
as genuine concepts, but concepts that are not descriptive (or scientific) but that are directly, 
genuinely evaluative. 
The purpose of this chapter is to outline a set of theoretical formulations and some studies 
that rely on an evaluative conception of intuitive psychology (Beauvois, 1976, 2011; Beauvois 
& Dubois, 2000, 2008, 2009; Dubois, 2006; Dubois & Beauvois, 2011) and, more specifically, 
of the intuitive psychology of personality traits. While this conception differs from most 
current theories, it can be likened to the formulations of researchers who differentiate 
between a paradigmatic manner of thinking and a narrative one (Zuckier, 1986). 
1.2 Psychological realism: Traits and implicit personality theories 
The continuist claim that the concepts handled by the naive, or intuitive, psychologist are 
descriptive or quasi-scientific has been referred to as psychological realism (Beauvois & 
Dépret, 2008). In psychological realism, the use of traits is regarded as a realist approach to a 
person’s psychological nature and these traits are assumed to be intrinsic properties of the 
person, the homo sapiens sapiens, about whom the intuitive psychologist is talking. This idea 
is based on a more basic hypothesis (the lexical hypothesis; see Mollaret & Mignon, 2006) 
that traits are efficient tools for decoding the psychological reality. Obviously, psychological 
realism does not presuppose that the intuitive psychologist never makes mistakes. As such, 
psychological realism is less concerned with the functioning of an individual than with the 
nature of the concepts he/she uses, in particular personality and personality traits. Because 
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traits, as quasi-scientific constructs, cannot be “seen” directly, they have to be apprehended 
via their visible behavioral manifestations. Accordingly, many models of social cognition 
(and, in particular, person memory; Srull & Wyer, 1989) stipulate that knowing about a 
person’s psychological nature means being able to encode his/her behaviors as traits.  
We use the term TB behaviors to designate the behaviors of a target person associated with a 
trait in memory (see Beauvois & Dubois, 2000). The well-known example of “pointing out a 
mistake made in one’s favor” is a TB that allows us to attribute the honest trait to a target 
person. For convenience’s sake, we consider that TB behaviors reflect knowledge that can be 
viewed as descriptive at the operational level. 
In intuitive psychology, one important line of research concerns the dimensions underlying 
the psychological descriptions made by people in terms of traits. These dimensions are seen 
as the implicit personality theories of the intuitive psychologist (Beauvois, 1982; Bruner & 
Tagiuri, 1954; Rosenberg & Sedlak, 1972; Schneider, 1973). When people are asked to 
describe either themselves or others using personality traits, their psychological descriptions 
are generally framed by a very limited number of dimensions, either one (Kim & Rosenberg, 
1980), two (Rosenberg & Sedlak, 1972) or five (Passini & Norman, 1966). Explanations for 
the theoretical foundations of these dimensions are often anchored in psychological realism, 
in that the dimensions are seen as referring to a psychological reality1. They are assumed to 
correspond to the structure of human personality, and the perceiver, as a quasi-scientific 
intuitive psychologist, therefore seeks to answer the question How can I characterize this 
person according to the basic dimensions of human personality? (Abele & Wojciszke, 2007; Judd, 
James-Hawkins, Yzerbyt, & Kashima, 2007; Suitner & Maass, 2008). Obviously, perceivers 
rapidly deduce the evaluative implications of the psychological realities they discover (Srull & 
Wyer, 1989). Moreover, psychological information is often processed precisely with the aim 
of arriving at these evaluative implications. However, the evaluations are reached on the 
basis of a presumed psychological reality by people who are explicitly or implicitly seen as 
potential intuitive scientists, even if they may, like all scientists, sometimes make mistakes. 
These errors do not invalidate the idea that the dimensions are genuine psychological 
dimensions that arise from people’s actual nature.  
By contrast, in the evaluative conception, dimensions are thought of as fundamentally 
social, and belonging to the registers of social values. 
1.3 The evaluative approach: Traits are criteria of social value but not descriptive 
constructs 
The evaluative approach rests on two major arguments:  
                                                 
1 This can be problematic when these dimensions are used in studies of stereotypes. The latter prompt the 
elaboration of a supposedly universal model: the Stereotype Content Model (see Echebarria Echabe, in this 
book). These presuppositions are problematic insofar as the truth value of stereotypes is often questioned 
in the psychosocial literature. The foundations of psychological realism can nevertheless be preserved by 
arguing that if the truth value of a stereotype is questionable, it is because that stereotype is the product of 
errors of judgment, which can be explained by social necessities. We may, for instance, think that the 
Chinese are smaller than the Indonesians. This is doubtless an error, but the fact remains that the size of a 
person is an authentic individual variable which allows us to express true or false judgments. After all, 
psychological realism does not imply that intuitive psychologists are accurate in all their judgments. 
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- An empirical argument: the main personality traits, the central most frequently used 
traits (Asch, 1946), are known to be strongly evaluative and only weakly descriptive in 
meaning (Labourin & Lecourvoisier, 1986). We have also known for a long time that the 
dimensions of implicit personality theories are clearly evaluative: they set “good traits”, 
such as intelligence and competence, against “bad traits”, such as stupidity and laziness (for 
a brief review, see Cambon, 2006). This opposition between good and bad traits rests on 
a social point of view (people who behave intelligently are more highly paid than 
people who behave stupidly because the former are more socially useful than the 
latter). The defenders of psychological realism therefore have to answer the following 
puzzling question: Why are humans (Homo sapiens sapiens) the only creatures in nature 
whose intrinsic properties vary linearly with social utility or value?  
- A cognitive and epistemological argument: an analysis of the cognitive construction of 
the meaning of personality traits (Beauvois, 1976, 1984; Beauvois & Dubois, 2000) 
reveals that the social value of people’s behaviors2 (e.g., the social value of the 
behaviors of a student said to be intelligent or honest) is not a secondary, post hoc 
inference (intelligent => intelligent behaviors => individual’s social value), but rather is 
inherent to the meaning of the traits in the first place (intelligence = a set of behavioral 
social values). A set of behavioral social values is the sole basis for the emergence of a 
personality trait. Most traits are constructed not to grasp an invisible individual 
characteristic, but to express the observed behavioral social value. This process is 
doubtful from an epistemological point of view. The mere connection between a 
behavior (or performance) and a personality-trait implies that the numerous variables 
(in particular situational variables) which, according to the determinist point of view, 
affect this behavior (or performance) are forgotten. Only the social value of behavior is 
retained and is “psychologized” through the use of an assumed causal trait (see 
Beauvois & Dubois, 2000, for a formal description of this process).  
In other words, when a pupil is said to be intelligent, the intelligence trait tells us nothing other 
than: this pupil has displayed a behavior (or performance) characterized by a certain kind of 
social value. Good (or poor) behavior (or performance) is thus translated into traits. These 
traits convey the person's social value without any descriptive or scientific (determinist) basis. 
In the above example, the value is named intelligence. Thus, personality traits intelligent, 
competent, helpful vs. weak, stupid, selfish are merely paraphrases of the social value of the 
behaviors or performances of the person concerned (Beauvois, 2011). This is the reason why 
traits tell us what we can or should do with people (the purpose of any evaluative activity), 
but say nothing about the individual variables that affected this behavior or performance.  
We use the term OB behaviors (see Beauvois & Dubois, 1992, 2000) to designate the behaviors 
that others can or should display towards a person known either by a trait or by a set of 
behaviors endowed with some social value that is expressed by that trait. For instance, for 
honest, you can give him confidential information or you can lend him your office keys. By 
definition, OB behaviors reflect an evaluative knowledge. If the evaluative conception is 
correct, traits in psychological descriptions should directly activate OB behaviors in 
memory, as well as TB behaviors.  
                                                 
2 It should be noted that the word value implies both positive and negative values (e.g., to successfully / 
unsuccessfully resolve a problem). 
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In short, the evaluative conception merely assumes that, through evaluative practices, 
everyone learns to use the language of personality traits and hence, implicit personality 
theories with the purpose of grasping and expressing, in psychological terms, the main 
aspects of the social value of people’s behaviors both the positive value (e.g., intelligent) and 
the negative value (e.g., stupid).  
In the following three sections, we discuss a variety of empirical studies whose findings 
provide strong support for the evaluative approach in psychological description (for a more 
comprehensive review, see Beauvois & Dubois, 2000, 2008, 2009). Section 2 deals with 
studies showing that OB behaviors are at least as important as TB behaviors in intuitive 
psychology (we use everyday psychological language to talk about what we do, can do and 
must do with people). Section 3 looks at studies showing that the evaluative conception 
allows us to account for the meaning of the dimensions at work in psychological description 
(the main factors extracted from psychological descriptions correspond to the main 
dimensions of people’s social value). Section 4 describes studies exploring the relevance of 
the evaluative conception in organizational contexts (recruitement, leadership, salaries). 
2. TBs and OBs in naive psychology: We use everyday psychological 
language to talk about what we do, can do or must do with people 
2.1 Semantic decision 
It was important at the beginning of this trend of research to show that OBs provide a 
system for encoding personological information that is just as efficient as the TB system. 
To this end, Beauvois and Dubois (1992, Study 1) conducted an experiment whereby a list of 
33 positive and negative traits was read out to a group of students who had to write down a 
behavior they considered to be characteristic of a person defined by each of those traits in 
turn (TB list). A second group had to write down a behavior that people might or should 
have towards that person (OB list). In a second phase, different students were shown the 
most frequent behaviors associated with each of the 33 traits on the TB or OBs lists. Then 
they were asked to select those they considered to be the most representative of each trait. They 
were also asked to rate their confidence after each choice on a 100-point scale. Results are 
given in Table 1 for positive and negative traits: the frequency hierarchies are virtually 
identical, as are the confidence curves for TBs and OBs. Similar results were obtained by 
Mignon and Mollaret (2002).  
 
 Rank 1 Rank 2 Rank 3 Rank 4 Rank 5 
TB frequency* 68 54 43 38 31 
OB frequency* 62 49 45 38 34 
TB confidence** 41.2 39.6 37.6 33 33.4 
OB confidence** 40.9 39.7 36.9 35.5 33.4 
* Rank 1= Mean frequency of choice (on all traits) for the top-ranking behaviors. Rank 2 = mean 
frequency of choice (on all traits) of the behaviors ranked second, etc. 
** Rank 1= Means on a 0-100 rating-scale (on all traits) for the top-ranking behaviors. Rank 2 = means 
(on all traits) of the behaviors ranked second, etc. 
Table 1a. OB and TB hierarchies and confidence for positive traits in Beauvois and Dubois 
(1992, Study 1) 
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 Rank 1 Rank 2 Rank 3 Rank 4 Rank 5 
TB frequency* 62 54 45 41 30 
OB frequency* 63 52 48 44 38 
TB confidence ** 40.1 38.85 38.3 36.5 36.9 
OB confidence** 36.8 34.8 34.1 33.7 33.5 
* Rank 1= Mean frequency of choice (on all traits) for the top-ranking behaviors. Rank 2 = mean 
frequency of choice (on all traits) of the behaviors ranked second, etc. 
** Rank 1= Means on a 0-100 rating-scale (on all traits) for the top-ranking behaviors. Rank 2 = means 
(on all traits) of the behaviors ranked second, etc. 
Table 1b. OBs and TBs hierarchies and confidence for negative traits in Beauvois and Dubois 
(1992, Study 1)  
In the two tables, no comparison of frequencies (Χ²) nor means (t test) inside the same rank 
reached the threshold of significance (.05). So, these results show that the OB register is no 
more ambiguous than the TB register3. They exclude the idea that the OB register is more 
idiosyncratic than the TB register. They seem hardly compatible with the idea that OBs are 
post hoc inferences made on the basis of TBs. One could, for example, claim that it is 
because I have stored honest => hands in wallets to the police (TB) in memory that I can infer 
that an honest person is someone to whom I can lend money (OB). 
Beauvois and Dubois (1992, Study 2) used a semantic decision task precisely to reject this 
idea as far as main traits are concerned. Subjects were asked to indicate as quickly as 
possible whether or not a particular OB or TB behavior was characteristic of a trait that had 
just been presented. Traits were either strongly evaluative (traits whose evaluative 
component outweighed the descriptive component: e.g., honest, dynamic) or weakly 
evaluative (traits whose descriptive component outweighted the evaluative component: e.g., 
shy or talkative). The twenty OB and TB were chosen so that twelve of them (6 OBs and 6 TBs 
with comprable association frequencies) exemplify the given trait, six of them (3 OBs and 3 
TBs) exemplify another trait and two of them (one OB and one TB) exemplify an antonym of 
the given trait. Reaction times were recorded. The significant behavior x traits interaction: 
F(1,17)= 13.30, p<.002 indicated that, for positive and negative responses alike, the OBs were 
judged as rapidly as TBs on strongly evaluative traits (1328ms vs. 1307 ms). On the other 
hand, they were judged more slowly on weakly evaluative traits (1647 ms vs. 1308 ms)4. 
These results allow us to contend that when highly evaluative traits are at stake (the most 
central traits), OBs are indeed stored and granted a status in long-term memory that is at 
least equivalent to that of TBs. In a subsequent semantic decision experiment, Beauvois, 
Dubois, and Tarquinio (1994) assigned half the subjects to a “social context” condition, 
where TBs and OBs were placed in a social setting that was relevant to the trait in question 
                                                 
3 The small difference between the two confidence curves for the negative traits is easily explained. 
Students were probably reluctant to attribute confidence to a decision that implied that they might act 
towards others in a negative way. For example, It is necessary to know how to shut him (her) up for 
chatterbox. Or It is necessary to put him (her) in his place for conceited 
4 These studies and the studies of Beauvois, Dubois, Mira and Monteil, 1996, presented immediately 
after, were performed about twenty years ago. At this time, the publishers only demanded mean values, 
results with significance levels. As we have not the data files, we regret not beeing able to provide other 
statistical indicators than those given in the published papers. 
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(at a party, he enjoys talking to everyone). Interestingly, in this condition, and always for the 
most evaluative traits, reaction times were shorter for OBs than for TBs, whereas no such 
difference was found in the “no social context” condition (i.e., the same condition as in 
Study 2 of Beauvois & Dubois, 1992). Again, these results are in line with the idea that the 
OBs for more central traits are activated without having to call upon TBs beforehand, in 
particular when there is a social context.  
2.2 Person memory 
Beauvois, Dubois, Mira, and Monteil (1996; see also Milhabet, 2004) described three studies 
exploring the person memory paradigm. Students listened to lists of behaviors comprising 
filler items, OBs and TBs said to characterize a single person. Four OBs and four TBs were 
provided in Studies 1 and 2, and six OBs and six TBs in Study 3. In all three studies, half the 
OBs and half the TBs were representative of a single trait that was either strongly evaluative 
(honest, dynamic, etc.), or weakly evaluative (shy, passionate, etc.) These traits varied from one 
experiment to another. In all three studies (see Table 2), the same significant behavior x trait 
interaction was observed: in study 1: F(1,216)= 53.03, p<.0001, with simple effects all p <.01; 
in study 2: F(1,191)= 36.07, p<.0001 with simple effects all p <.001; in study 3: F(1,114)= 61.27, 
p<.0001 with simple effects all p <.001. 
 
 Study 1 Study 2 Study 3 
 OB 
behaviors 
TB  
behaviors 
OB 
behaviors 
TB  
behaviors 
OB  
behaviors 
TB 
behaviors 
Most 
evaluative 
traits 
2.76 2.37 2.54 1.92 2.68 1.59 
Least 
evaluative 
traits 
1.96 3.10 1.86 2.68 1.74 2.29 
Table 2. Means for OBs and TBs recalled in Beauvois, Dubois, Mira, and Monteil (1996) 
For highly evaluative traits, subjects remembered more OBs than TBs, and vice versa for less 
evaluative traits. Results suggested that OBs are endowed with a memory structuring power 
that exceeds that of TBs. In the third experiment, the virtual social relation between target 
and participant was manipulated. The subjects were students, while the target was said to 
be either “a person”, “a student” or “a teacher”. The interaction was strongest, and 
accounted for a greater proportion of variance, when the target was one of the student’s 
professors (i.e., power relationship) than when the target was a student or a person. Again, 
as in Beauvois, Dubois and Tarquinio’s study (2004), the structuring power of the OBs was 
strongest when a social context was induced. 
2.3 Implications 
The above-described studies validate three implications of the evaluative conception. As far 
as the more central traits are concerned: 
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a. the evaluative component is mobilized just as much as the descriptive component in the 
intuitive use of traits. In other words, OBs constitute a means of encoding the 
knowledge provided by the traits and are called upon either in conjunction with TBs or 
as an alternative to them; 
b. evaluative knowledge is not the product of inferences drawn from descriptive 
knowledge. In other words, from an operational standpoint, OBs are part of the 
meaning of a trait and do not presuppose TBs; 
c. the evaluative component of traits becomes more accessible and is more frequently 
used when the social context is made salient.  
Others studies (see Beauvois & Dubois, 2000) have yielded further empirical evidence of 
the validity of the evaluative conception of trait meaning. In particular, they have shown 
that OBs and TBs have different effects on first impressions (zero-acquaintance 
paradigm): OBs are more effective than TBs as far as interpersonal differentiation 
(evaluation) is concerned, while TBs are better than OBs at allowing intraindividual 
analysis of targets (description). It has also been shown that OBs are just as good recall 
cues as TBs in person memory and that OBs define a universe that is a good 
approximation of implicit personality theories established on the basis of the traits 
themselves. Moreover, people whose job involves judging other people for the purposes 
of determining which actions to take towards them (e.g., social workers) exhibit a 
sociocognitive functioning which relies more on the evaluative component of intuitive 
psychology than on the descriptive one.  
The choice of the word “evaluative” to refer to a register of knowledge may seem 
surprising. In the psychosocial literature, it is always associated with the affective or 
emotional register, which is why the evaluative process has attracted so little attention from 
social cognition theorists. This is the consequence of the dichotomous thinking that we 
mentioned above. Evaluation can rarely be considered as a scientific activity. It cannot 
therefore be considered as a competence of the intelligent thinking. Thus, evaluation is of 
the emotional register. And yet it seems clear that OBs give rise to genuine knowledge (from 
this point of view, they have the same status as TBs), namely the knowledge of what we can 
or should do with people. Of course, this knowledge is sometimes inferred from another, 
possibly more descriptive kind of knowledge (TBs). But for traits that are very common in 
psychological descriptions, namely the most central ones, which are more evaluative than 
descriptive in nature, the evaluation is supplied directly as knowledge of what we can or 
should do with people, that is, knowledge of their social value (Beauvois, 2011). People’s 
social value cannot be a mere individual fact. Human resources managers cannot refer to 
their affective reactions to fix salaries or grant promotions. Nor can professors bank on their 
emotions when marking their students’ work. Both can very exceptionally only justify their 
evaluation by the science. Now, their decisions must be understandable. Social evaluative 
knowledge, we said it, must be endowed with social acceptance. Obviously, the managers’ 
and professors’ decisions can still be disputed, but any contestation must be based on a 
piece of acceptable evaluative knowledge. We can see how the prevalent idea in social 
psychology that evaluation is derived from an emotional register has caused social 
psychologists to neglect an important aspect of the knowledge conveyed by naive 
psychology. 
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3. The evaluative conception and the two-factor model: The main factors 
extracted from psychological descriptions are the main dimensions of 
people’s social value 
We have said that when people are asked to describe either themselves or others using 
personality traits, the psychological descriptions they produce are generally framed by one, 
two or five main factors (or dimensions). The two-dimensions approach is the most 
stimulating one today (see Special Issue, European Journal of Social Psychology, 2008; see also 
Echebarria Echabe, in this book). The first dimension pertains to the quality of the target 
person's interpersonal relationships (e.g., warm, helpful, honest vs. cold, irritable, selfish), while 
the second refers to the energy and resources that the target person invests in his/her 
activities (e.g., intelligent, ambitious, active vs. lazy, weak, careless). These two dimensions have 
been given various names which, from a theoretical standpoint, may seem arbitrary: value 
vs. dynamism (Osgood, 1962), social good-bad vs. intellectual good-bad (Rosenberg & 
Sedlak, 1972), other-profitability vs. self-profitability (Peeters, 1992), morality vs. 
competence (Wojciszke, 1994, 2005), warmth vs. competence (Fiske, Cuddy, & Glick, 2007), 
communion vs. agency (Abele & Wojciszke, 2007), etc. Except for a few variations, however, 
these two dimensions always contain the same traits, at least as far as the positive pole is 
concerned.  
According to psychological realism, these two dimensions are clearly derived from genuine 
psychological knowledge of what people are (i.e., from the standpoint of a virtually 
scientific or quasi-scientific descriptive psychology). They refer to a psychological reality in 
the form of psychological information that is extracted by the perceiver and/or derived 
from the dimensions of human personality. 
This view is challenged by the advocates of the evaluative conception. They assume that 
both types of information are derived not from truly psychological knowledge of people, 
but rather from a social evaluation of people that is directly supplied by interchangeable 
traits (i.e., intelligent, capable, clever, gifted). In addition to the above arguments, there is an 
important historical argument: the two dimensions were identified by industrial 
psychologists studying the occupational value of men and women in the workplace (see De 
Montmollin, 1972; Tiffin & McCormick, 1965). These two dimensions therefore emerged 
from people's knowledge of two basic aspects of the social value of employees in 
organizations. In this context, but also in a more general way, the value of a person is 
generally apprehended through the observation of poor or good behaviors, judgments or 
performances. As we demonstrated earlier, poor or good behaviors (or performances, or 
judgments) are then given labels (assumed causal traits). Implicit personality theories, 
which are essentially semantic or conceptual in nature (Shweder & D'Andrade, 1979) are 
then activated, giving rise to descriptions that go far beyond what has actually been 
observed (intelligent and competent activate ambitious, ambitious activates dynamic; helpful 
activates nice, nice activates sociable, sociable activates honest, and so on.) This evaluative view 
led Beauvois (1995) to propose new names for the two dimensions and to emphasize their 
evaluative nature by presenting them from an evaluator's viewpoint: social desirability for 
the former, social utility for the latter.  
Their definitions are set out below. First, however, we describe three sets of studies which 
have yielded strong evidence supporting this evaluative view.  
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3.1 Social desirability and social utility of professionals. Is a factory manager more 
competent than a hospital manager? 
Cambon (2004) borrowed Ricardo’s and Smith’s opposition (echoed by Marx) between 
production (production of goods for the market) and maintenance (taking care of the 
producers) within a social structure. In several studies, he studied the psychological 
descriptions of different professionals known only by their occupation (e.g., a factory 
manager in the production sector vs. a hospital manager in the maintenance sector). These 
descriptions were made in terms of positive or negative traits indicating social desirability 
or social utility. Every description was analyzed using a utility index and a desirability 
index (number of positive adjectives minus number of negative adjectives). In studies where 
gender stereotypes and professional status were manipulated or controlled, Cambon 
observed that professionals working in the production sector were seen as more useful than 
desirable, whereas professionals working in the maintenance sector were often described as 
more desirable than useful (see Table 3 for the data of Study 4 in which the gender of the 
targets was controlled).  
 
 Production Maintenance 
Social utility 1.06 0.31 
Social desirability 0.10 0.63 
Table 3. Mean desirability index and mean utility index for psychological descriptions of 
professionals working in production versus maintenance sectors (subjects: economics 
students) in Cambon (2004, study 4) 
These data were submitted to a 2 (professional sector: production vs. maintenance) x 2 
(traits: social utility vs. social desirability) ANOVA. This analysis yielded the predicted 
interaction, F(1,49)= 28,56; p <.001. Such results are not easy to explain from the 
psychological realism perspective (who can say that the director of a hospital is less 
“competent” than the director of a factory?) On the contrary, they are typical of our 
evaluative approach and justify our quasi-economic idea of social utility. Adam Smith said 
that when a worker is hired, (economic) value is created, while when a domestic is hired, 
(economic) value is consumed. Economists have indeed often claimed that production 
activities are more typical of (economic) value than maintenance activities. We can 
understand why production professionals are more highly rated on the most "economic" 
dimension (i.e., the social utility dimension). This certainly does not mean that they are, 
from a purely "psychological" point of view, more competent, more dynamic than 
maintenance professionals, who are supposedly nicer and more honest. Rather, it simply 
means that, because they occupy different economic positions, they are not judged on the 
same social values. Since we do not use the same traits to express different values, 
production and maintenance professionals are described using different personality traits. 
Intuitive psychologists have no access to invisible psychological realities. They talk about 
what they see or think they are seeing in a social structure or in a given context. The words 
they use are embedded in that social structure or context. Consequently, intuitive 
psychologists always talk about a target and about the value of that target within the social 
structure or context.  
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3.2 A human psychological reality is not a prerequisite for the emergence of either 
dimension: Are some pet rabbits more competent than others? 
The evaluative approach assumes that social desirability and social utility do not have a 
human psychological reality as empirical reference. Rather, they operate independently of 
any kind of empirical or even conceivable human psychological reality. The notion of 
“human psychological reality” is specific to psychological realism: a human psychological 
reality is any human object that can be thought of and studied via a descriptive scientific or 
quasi-scientific psychology. The advocates of the “man as scientist” axiom or of 
psychological realism will necessarily agree with this definition. They will contend that the 
two dimensions of social judgment are linked to two human psychological realities (two 
registers of personality-traits). We, however, take the view that they are two basic aspects of 
people’s social value: the value of people in interpersonal contexts and the value of people 
in activity (work) contexts. It has been asserted (cf. Dubois & Beauvois, 2011) that these two 
dimensions exist independently of an empirical and even a conceivable human 
psychological reality, and are activated through implicit personality theories, solely via the 
retrieval of the described object's social value. This is why the subjects in Dubois and 
Beauvois’ experiment (2011, Study 2) were told to pick personality traits from a list to 
describe not people but pet rabbits, after they had been given two pieces of information 
about the mere social value of those rabbits, namely price ([in]expensive) and love 
([un]loved). No other information was given. The traits provided for the “description” were 
located at the positive and negative poles of either the social desirability dimension (likeable, 
pleasant, warm vs. aggressive, irritable, cold) or the social utility dimension (active, intelligent, 
dynamic vs. stupid, lazy, weak). Two principal component analyses were performed (PCA). 
a. The first PCA (see Table 4) revealed two factors accounting for 50% of the variance. We 
considered only the first two factors because we wanted to verify that they were in 
accordance with those brought out in the literature. In addition, we observed an 
important drop in the explained variance between the second factor (15.85%) and the 
third factor (10.58%). These two factors were identical to those usually found in 
psychological description studies. The first factor (accounting for 35.02% of the 
variance) set high social-desirability traits (likeable, pleasant, warm) against low social-
desirability traits (aggressive, irritable, cold). The second factor (accounting for 15.85% of 
the variance) set high social-utility traits (dynamic, intelligent, active) against low social-
utility traits (lazy, spineless, stupid, weak).  
b. A second PCA was then performed with price and love (see Table 4). The introduction of 
these two variables did not change the factor structure. The PCA also revealed two first 
factors accounting for more than 50% of the variance (35.78% for the first factor and 
18.06% for the second factor)5. Taken together, these results confirmed the evaluative 
nature of the factors).  
Love was associated with social desirability, price with social utility. The fact that the two 
classic dimensions of social judgment were obtained in conditions where no descriptive 
information was available but only information about the rabbits’ social value (love: social 
desirability, and price: social utility) led us to question the descriptive basis of person 
description. We think that these results validate our claim that person description simply 
                                                 
5 The third factor was accounting for 11.04% of the variance. 
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amounts to situating individuals on the two basic dimensions of social value rather than on 
the two dimensions of a true psychology of Homo sapiens sapiens (psychological realism), a 
true psychology which thus remains uncharted waters. These dimensions only tell us about 
the social value of individuals.   
 
 First PCA without Price and Love Second PCA with Price and Love 
 Factor1 Factor2 Factor1 Factor2 
Likeable .876 -.116 .884 .281 
Pleasant .871 -.112 .843 .285 
Warm .838 -.129 .795 .188 
Aggressive -.843 0 -.833 -.263 
Irritable -.780 .225 -.813 0 
Cold -484 .361 -.615 0 
Dynamic 0 -.751 .492 -.597 
Intelligent .114 -.537 .188 -.553 
Active 0 -.532 178 -.497 
Lazy 0 .624 -.321 .625 
Stupid -.137 .616 -.387 .567 
Weak -.139 .443 -.190 .538 
Spineless -475 .621 -.475 .479 
Love 
 
.778 .341 
Price -.287 -.427 
Table 4. Factor matrix for the two PCA (without and with love and price) in Dubois and 
Beauvois (2011, study 2) 
3.3 Social value of people and social value of everyday objects: From a person to a 
car 
Recent studies (Cambon, 2007; Schiffler, Dubois, & Mollaret, 2010) have shown that the 
bidimensional evaluation of people bears some similarity to the bidimensional evaluation of 
everyday objects, such as watches, tables and cars. Readers who recall Osgood’s writings 
will not be surprised (Osgood, Suci, & Tanenbaum, 1957): with his theory of semantic 
mediation, Osgood would certainly not have been a proponent of psychological realism6. 
When Schiffler et al. (2010) ran a PCA on descriptions of everyday objects, they came up 
with two dimensions. On the first one, attractive, nice, and amusing were contrasted with 
horrible, ugly and square. On the second one, luxury, extremely expensive and chic were set 
against cheap, bottom of the range and poor quality. The first dimension was named 
“agreeableness” and the second “market value”. Results were similar to those obtained with 
pet rabbits. We can therefore legitimately wonder whether evaluative processes are 
                                                 
6 Remember that the component of the connotative meaning is nothing other that a kind of memories of 
anterior responses towards objects. 
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characterized by a fundamental duality, in that, at least in our societies, these processes 
distinguish between pleasure derived from contact with an object and the economic value of 
that object. If this is indeed the case, the social desirabilty and social utility of human beings 
correspond to the agreeableness and market value of objects. This fundamental duality 
obviously only fits in with the evaluative conception put forward in this chapter. 
Schiffler et al. conducted an experiment to confirm this fundamental duality. Subjects first 
had to make a decision concerning photos of target individuals’ faces. This decision was 
manipulated through instructions steering them towards the social desirability of these 
targets (choose the person who has most friends), or their social utility (choose the person who has 
the highest salary). In the second phase of the experiment, the same subjects had to choose the 
most typical adjectives for 12 objects (armchair, car, pen, etc.). Adjectives were selected on 
the basis of the above-mentioned PCA. They were either descriptive or evaluative (either 
high in agreeableness: amusing, ugly, or high in market value: luxurious, downmarket). Phases 
1 and 2 were presented as pertaining to two distinct experiments (priming paradigm). 
Schiffler et al. expected decisions about target individuals in the first phase to prime the 
choice of adjectives in the second phase. More specifically, they predicted that the social 
desirability instruction would drive the choice of agreeableness and that social utility 
instruction would drive the choice of market value. Results are given in Table 5. 
The 2 (kind of priming: social desirability vs. social utility) x 2 (kind of adjectives: 
agreeableness vs. market value) ANOVA performed on the data (see Table 5) showed a 
significant interaction effect, F(1,47) = 14.38 p < .001, η2 = .234. Results confirmed expectations: 
the social desirability of people primed the agreeableness of objects (F(1,47) = 11.14 p < .002, 
η2 = .192), whereas the social utility of people primed market value (F(1,47) = 4.15 p < .05, 
η2 = .081). These results can be perfectly explained by the evaluative conception, but not by a 
strictly realist conception. When individuals look at an object, they see it from an evaluative 
point of view which is not an implication of the object’s nature. This evaluative point of view 
can be acquired through a previous evaluative experience with another kind of object. 
Furthermore, evaluative experiences would appear to be shaped by two types of relationship 
with an object, confirming the idea of a fundamental evaluative duality. 
 
Kind of adjectives Kind of priming 
 Social desirability Social utility 
Agreeableness 0.62 (0.15) 0.51 (0.16) 
Market value 0.41 (0.23) 0.64 (0.18) 
The chosen adjectives were coded 1; the not chosen adjectives were coded 0. The scores given in the 
table correspond to the average difference between the chosen adjectives and the not chosen adjectives 
pertaining to the considered dimension. 
Table 5. Saliency indexes (means and standard deviations) as a function of kind of priming 
and kind of adjectives in Shiffler, Dubois and Mollaret (2010) 
However, even if social desirability and social utility are homologous with agreeableness 
and market value, we cannot bank on their strict equivalence. The fundamental evaluative 
duality takes diverse forms according to the type of object. The social desirabilty of human 
beings, for instance, seems to have at least two components, namely morality (honest, sincere) 
and sociability (helpful, warm). While sociability can be seen as the "human" shape of 
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agreeableness, there seems to be no relevant equivalent of morality for a watch or a rabbit. 
This is why we can surmise that this fundamental duality results from people’s evaluative 
experience, particularly through evaluative practices, which is then generalized to the 
evaluation of nonhuman objects.  
3.4 Social utility is associated with social differentiation 
Other research that is typical of the evaluative conception can be summed up in a single 
proposition: “worthful people” are seen as being socially useful rather than socially desirable. It 
has been shown that “worthful people” make normative judgments (see Dubois, 2003 and 
Beauvois & Dubois, 2009 for the concept of social judgment norms). For example, “worthful 
people” have been found to be more internal, more self-sufficient and more optimistic than 
others. Several studies have shown that the more normative people are in their judgments, the 
more they are considered and consider themselves to be socially useful. In these studies, 
subjects were given questionnaires filled out by a person showing himself/herself to be either 
normative or counternormative in his/her answers. They were then asked to describe, usually 
with adjectives7, the person that was supposed to have filled out the questionnaire. Results 
showed that the internal targets were seen as more socially useful than the external ones 
(Cambon, Djouari, & Beauvois, 2006; Dubois & Beauvois, 2005). The self-sufficient targets were 
also seen as more socially useful that the non-self-sufficient targets (Dubois, 2005; Dubois & 
Beauvois, 2005), and the optimistic targets were likewise seen as more socially useful than the 
nonoptimistic or pessimistic targets (Le Barbenchon & Milhabert, 2005; Milhabet, 2011). This 
link between normativeness and social utility persists in self-descriptions. Cambon et al. asked 
students to fill out an internality questionnaire, then describe themselves using adjectives. 
They observed an almost linear relationship between the internality of these students and the 
social utility they assigned themselves. 
This body of research is interesting because it shows that “psychological description”, 
regarded as an evaluative  —and as such attributing social utility or social desirability—, is a 
way of communicating a person’s social value when this value is assessed on other criteria. 
The above-mentioned normativeness of judgment is not the only criterion of people’s social 
value. Other criteria are linked to social structure, in particular the positions occupied by 
individuals within that structure as well as the profits associated with those positions. We 
have good reason to think that psychological descriptions vary with these criteria, as we saw 
with Cambon (2004)’s results. These criteria are discussed below in the organizational context.  
We conclude this section with a hypothesis derived from previous research. Significant 
social differences have been shown to give rise to differences in social utility, but less so in 
social desirability (professionals working in the production sector are seen as more socially 
useful but not more socially desirable than professionals working in the maintenance sector; 
normative individuals are seen as more socially useful but not more socially desirable than 
counternormative individuals). We can therefore deduce that while social utility is used to 
corroborate some important social differences, social desirability is used to compensate for a 
lack of social valorization. Social desirability is thus used by people who are not socially 
valued as a means of self-promotion, in other words, to earn a judgment that is not too 
pejorative: I am certainly not dynamic and ambitious (understood: like worthful individuals), but 
                                                 
7 More rarely by means of rating scales. 
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I am honest and helpful (see Kervyn, Yzerbyt & Judd, 2011; Yzerbyt, Kervyn, & Judd, 2008, for 
compensation effects). 
4. Social desirability and social utility in organizational contexts: Social utility 
corresponds to people’s economic value 
This section is divided into two parts. Part 1 deals with the role of social utility in the 
organizational context. Part 2 discusses the relevance of breaking social utility down into 
three components, each with a different status in an organization and, more generally, in 
society. 
4.1 Social utility in recruitment 
4.1.1 Recruitment or cooptation? 
In a study by Dubois and Aubert (2010, Study 1), executives in charge of a team and who 
had considerable experience in assessment were told to put themselves in the position of 
recruiting a target peer described in terms of socially useful or socially desirable adjectives. 
As predicted (see Table 6, study 1), the socially useful target candidate (active, intelligent, 
organized, etc.) was judged by the vast majority to be more recruitable than the socially 
desirable target candidate (agreeable, honest, helpful, etc.): F(1,70)= 80.42,  p<.001, η2= .535. 
In a second study, Dubois and Aubert compared a recruitment condition to a co-optation 
condition. In this last condition, students were asked to coopt a target person to go on 
vacation. This target person was described using the same socially useful or socially 
desirable adjectives as those used in the recruitment condition. The 2(condition: recruitment 
vs. co-optation) x 2 (target: socially useful vs. socially desirable) between-subjects ANOVA 
performed on the data (see Table 6, study 2) showed a significant interaction effect, 
F(1,396)= 1552.445, p<.001, η2= .797). Whereas a similar result to that of Study 1 was 
observed in the recruitment condition (the socially useful target was the one most frequently 
recruited), an opposite result was found in the friend cooptation situation (the socially 
desirable target was this time the most frequently coopted). 
The results of these two studies led to a simple idea that we have already touched on, 
namely, that social utility is a relevant selection criterion as far as economic value is 
concerned (i.e., in organizations and the workplace), but social desirabilty is a relevant 
selection criterion as far as interpersonal relations are concerned.  
 
 Socially useful target Socially desirable target 
Study 1 recruitment condition 
88 executives 
6.11 (1.14) 
 
3.39 (1.42) 
 
Study 2 recruitement condition 
200 students 
Study 2 co-optation condition 
200 students 
79.24 (11.66) 
 
43.55 (11.22) 
35.95 (10.02) 
 
81.60 (8.01) 
Table 6. Selection of a socially useful vs. socially desirable target person (means and 
standard deviations) in Dubois and Aubert (2010, Study 1 and Study 2) 
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4.1.2 Recruitment for a job in production or a job in maintenance? 
The above results nevertheless raise an important question. We have already seen (Cambon, 
2004) that while social utility is the main value in production, this is not the case in 
maintenance. Dubois and Aubert’s studies therefore needed to be replicated in the light of 
these two sectors. To this end, Dubois (2010a, Study 4) looked at ordinary employees’ 
ratings of a target applicant’s chances of being hired when the applicant was said to be 
either socially useful (active, intelligent, organized, efficient, hardworking) or socially desirable 
(agreeable, honest, open-minded, helpful, likeable). Vacant positions were a high- or low-ranking 
position in either the production sector or the maintenance sector of the economy (head of 
an automobile company for the high-status production job, milling machine operator for the 
low-status production job, artistic director at an opera house for the high-status maintenance 
job, and sports coach at a summer camp for the low-status maintenance job). A 2(types of trait 
descriptions: socially useful vs. socially desirable) x 2 (job sectors:production vs. maintenance) 
x 2 (job statuses: high vs. low) ) between-subjects ANOVA performed on the data (see Table 7) 
showed a significant types of traits x job sectors interaction effect, F(1,53) = 19.42, p < .001, 
η2 = .113. The breakdown of this interaction indicated firstly that the type-of-trait effect was 
only found for the production jobs (F(1,53) = 36.03, p < .001, η2  = .191): when presented as 
socially useful, both applicants applying for a production job were rated as more likely to be 
hired (M = 3.64) than when they were presented as socially desirable (M = 2.42). For the 
maintenance jobs, whether presented as socially useful (M = 3.30) or socially desirable 
(M = 3.35), the applicant's chances of being recruited were the same (F(1,53) = .06, ns). The fact 
that the second-order interaction was nonsignificant (F(1,53) = .70, ns) showed that the job-
rank variable did not affect the type-of-trait by job-sector interaction. Such results clearly 
showed that social utility was the dominant value when the production sector was involved 
(whether for a job as the head of an automobile company or as a milling machine operator). 
There was no such finding for applicants seeking a position in the maintenance sector 
(whether as an artistic director or a sports coach). 
 
 
Applicant's profile 
Job economic sector 
Production Maintenance 
 High-status Low-status High-Sstatus Low-status 
Socially useful 3.70 (0.86) 3.57 (0.81) 3.20 (0.83) 3.40 (1.05) 
Socially desirable 2.35 (0.75) 2.50 (1.05) 3.35 (0.88) 3.35 (0.99) 
Table 7. Mean scores and standard deviations for the target applicant's chances of being 
hired by job economic sector, status and profile of the target in Dubois (2010a, Study 4) 
4.2 Three components of social utility
8
 
When we look at the actual meaning of the words, we find that the traits located at the 
positive poles of the two dimensions are not at all similar. Honesty and helpfulness, for 
instance, (two traits traditionally found at the positive pole of the first dimension) do not 
belong to the same register of meaning. Similarly, ambition and competence (two traits found 
                                                 
8 The studies which follow are very recent. They have been presented at scientific meetings, but have 
not yet been published. 
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at the positive pole of the second dimension) belong to two different registers, as far as their 
simple meaning is concerned. These same semantic problems are observed when we 
consider the negative poles. Why would a shy person (trait located at the negative pole of 
the second dimension) not be competent (trait located at the positive pole of this same second 
dimension)? Similarly, why would a liar (located at the negative pole of the first dimension) 
not be warm (located at the positive pole of this same first dimension)? This observation has 
led researchers to introduce a distinction between morality and sociability within the first 
dimension (Brambilla, Rusconi, Sacchi, & Cherubini, 2011). French researchers have 
proposed several differentiations within the second factor which have recently turned out to 
be very productive. While certain traits belonging to the second dimension (which we call 
“social utility” but many name “competence”) directly evoke ideas of competence or 
incompetence (intelligent and capable at the positive pole, and stupid and out of his/her depth at 
the negative pole), other traits (e.g., courageous at the positive pole, and shy at the negative 
pole) have nothing to do with (in)competence. This is why the second factor has been 
broken down into the following three components.  
1. effort (in an activity; i.e., persevering). Description of someone who is hardworking, 
extremely conscientious and always sees his or her work through to the end, even if it is 
difficult;  
2. competence (in an activity; i.e., capable) Description of someone who has considerable 
abilities, masters techniques well and knows how to resolve problems; 
3. ease (in an activity; i.e., competitive). Description of someone who is ambitious, feels at 
ease with the competition and is never temperamental. 
We evoke just two studies here. Dubois (2010b) asked subjects to read the three above 
descriptions through carefully. The latter were said to be descriptions of three employees. 
The experimenter then informed the subjects of these employees’ status: one was said 
factory manager, another was said foreman and the third, manual worker. Subjects had to 
match descriptions and status. In another group, instead of statuses, Dubois gave the 
salaries of these employees: one earned €6,000 a month, another earned €3,000, and the third 
€1,500. Similarly, subjects had to match descriptions and salaries. The results  (Tables 8a and 
8b) support the predictions in a very significant way for the statuses (for « factory 
manager » : Χ(2)²= 29.4, p< .001, for « foreman » : Χ(2)²= 22.4, p< .001, for « manual worker » : 
Χ(2)²= 35, p<.001) and in an only marginally way for salaries, although the salaries associated 
with the three components were in the expected direction (for “€6,000”: Χ(2)²= 2.4, ns, for 
« €3,000” : Χ(2)²= 4.2, ns, and for “€1,500”: Χ(2)²= 5,4, p <.07).   
These results suggest that the highest status was associated with the “at ease in the activity” 
portrait and the lowest status was associated with the “effort” portrait and, to a lesser extent 
that the lowest salary was associated with the “effort” portrait. 
These results prompted the author to wonder whether the observed hierarchy of the three 
components of social utility was specific to one particular organizational culture. A study by 
Mollaret and Miraucourt (n.d) has now provided an answer to that question. These 
researchers asked servicemen, public-sector workers and the employees of a large private 
company to say how much money (7-point rating scale) 75 traits would fetch a member of 
the organization to which they belonged. The traits were representative either of effort, 
competence, or ease. The researchers were thus able to calculate how much money the three 
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components were worth in each organization. Ease was found to be the dominant value in 
the private sector, but not in the other two organizational models under scrutiny. 
Interestingly, when they asked people encountered in their own homes or in the street, to 
say what the same 75 traits might bring someone in a general way (without referring to any 
particular organization), they reproduced the results for the private sector. The results are 
set out in Table 9. 
 
status At ease in the activity Competence Effort 
Factory manager 80% 10% 10% 
Foreman 20% 73.33% 6.67% 
Manual worker 0% 16.67% 83.33% 
Table 8a. Status associated with the three components of social utility in Dubois (2010b) 
 
Salaries At ease in the activity Competence Effort 
€6,000 46.67% 26.67% 26.67% 
€3,000 30% 50% 20% 
€1,500 23.33% 23.33% 53.37% 
Table 8b. Salaries associated with the three components of social utility in Dubois (2010b) 
 
 Ease (E) Competence (C) Effort (Ef) 
Employees of a private 
company  
5.72 (0.54) 4.86 (1.11) 4.78 (0.95) 
Servicemen 4.87 (0.62) 4.87 (0.85) 5.38 (0.78) 
Public-sector workers 4.71 (0.89) 5.28 (0.82) 4.65 (0.77) 
Random sample 5.48 (0.65) 4.80 (1.33) 4.60 (1.28) 
Table 9. Mean economic value (and standard deviations) for adjectives associated with ease, 
competence and effort worth in three organizational models and in a random sample in 
Mollaret and Miraucourt (n.d) 
“Ease” seemed to be the preferred value in private companies (F(2, 44)= 16.91, p <.001 ; η2  = 
.43). The analysis of contrasts showed that subjects choosed significantly more “Ease” than 
“Competence” and “Effort” (undifferentiated). “Competence” seemed to be the most chosen 
value by public-sector workers (F(2, 44)= 6.65, p < .01 ; η2  = .23). The analysis of contrasts 
showed that subjects choosed significantly more “Competence” than “Ease” and “Effort” 
(undifferentiated). “Effort” seemed the value prized by servicemen (F(2, 44)= 5.61, p < .01 ; 
η2  = .20). The analysis of contrasts showed that subjects choosed significantly more “Effort” 
than “Ease” and “Competence” (undifferentiated). As we might have expected on the basis 
of an analysis of ideological processes in our society, the general public seemed to be 
imbued with the private-sector model (F(2, 44)= 9.67, p <.001 ; η2  = .30). The analysis of 
contrasts showed that subjects choosed significantly more “Ease” than “Competence” and 
“Effort” (undifferentiated). 
The research described in this section confirms the idea that social utility is the most 
relevant dimension in business organizations in the production sector and that it comes in 
the shape of a hierarchy indicating people’s market value in these organizations. Ease is at 
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the top of this hierarchy, with the highest status, and effort at the bottom, with the lowest 
status. To the best of our knowledge, social desirabilty has yet to give rise to studies that 
would allow us to organize morality and sociability in a similar hierarchy.  
Taken together, these findings can help us to put forward new definitions. 
5. Conclusion 
The previous sections should allow readers to judge for themselves the contribution of the 
empirical bases of the following evaluative definitions of the two factors (the “big two”, as 
they are sometimes called): 
- A person’s social desirability is his or her reputation for arousing positive (vs. negative) 
affects in others and for going along with (vs. going against) other people’s motivations. 
It has at least two components, namely morality and sociability (or agreeableness); 
- A person’s social utility is his or her reputation for being able (vs. unable) to occupy 
different positions in social organizations, positions ranged from the least high to the 
highest. It has at least three components, ranging from the least valued to the most 
valued, namely effort, competence and ease; 
- A person’s reputation for being more or less desirable and more or less useful is the 
product of the social evaluative practices to which the person has been subjected. When 
an evaluation is communicated in the form of personality traits, these traits activate in 
memory the behaviors that can or should be adopted towards that target person, in 
other words, what could or should be done with him/her. There are good reasons to 
think that people internalize the main aspects of their reputation. 
The above evaluative conception can be summed up in a basic idea whereby the concepts of 
naive psychology are not intended to describe human beeing from a psychological, scientific 
or quasi-scientific point of view, but instead to evaluate them as social actors or agents. The 
dimensional structure of implicit personality theories does not reflect the structure of 
human psychology, but rather the two main registers of social values that people realize (or 
should realize) through their behavior (e.g., depending on whether they are hardworking or 
lazy). We do not claim that people are stupid or irrational. The fact of not being centred on 
the intrinsic, descriptive properties of objects and people must not be considered as an 
indication of stupidity. On the contrary, we claim that people behave as fine analysts when 
they deal with things that are important to them, namely, the value of people and things, 
even if the intrinsic nature of those people and things is not their main preoccupation9. The 
register of the social values is not a register which is used by default. It is not established by 
imaginary whims. This register is made by realities. People refer to these realities to hire 
somebody, to pay him/her, to associate him/her with projects of work or leisure activities 
                                                 
9 Moreover, if our subjects are perfectly capable of mobilizing their I.P.T. and to produce both 
dimensions of the social value of the persons when we incite them to psychologize by asking them to 
describe pet rabbits with personality traits (Dubois & Beauvois, 2011, study 2, see above) , equivalent 
subjects, placed in quite a different situation, a situation of purchase on the market (Dubois & Beauvois, 
2011, study 3), recognize that nobody would pay a high price for a rabbit because it is intelligent. In this 
situation, the subjects deal with the social value of a rabbit, without psychologizing. They say that we 
can pay a high price for a rabbit if it is beautiful and if it is of pure race. What corresponds to the reality 
of the market. 
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and even to marry him/her. In numerous domains of the life and the social life (agriculture, 
crafts, interpersonal relations…), people learnt at first to handle this register of social 
realities without adopting a scientific way of thinking. Science came much later, when it 
came: at this beginning of XXI° century, it is not sure that science came in psychology of 
individual differences.  Indeed, what is presented as individual differences in personality are 
in fact differences in the social value of people. We can even wonder if a scientific psychology 
of the individual differences will not have to give up the concept of "personality" which is 
maybe too much filled with evaluative perception of people. 
We conclude with the two main advantages of this evaluative conception.  
The evaluative conception does not rely on any of the assumptions about the validity of the 
psychology used by laypeople as a tool of descriptive or scientific knowledge, assumptions 
which, since the fifties, and despite Heider (1958), have often been criticized by social 
psychologists either directly or indirectly. In particular, this conception does not require naive 
psychologists (1) to be aware of the psychological nature of their own personality or that of 
their target, (2) to have spontaneous access to that nature, or (3) to speak about that nature as 
an intuitive scientist would speak (which they never do for other objects of knowledge, except 
obviously when the person who speaks is a scientist in the exercise of his/her work).  
The evaluative conception considers people in terms of their concrete social existence. The 
research reported in this chapter supports the idea that the evaluative approach is indeed 
derived from a psychology that is possibly scientific, but definitely social. People are evaluated 
on a daily basis in social situations which involve them as agents or social actors. They are not 
evaluated as human beings. We do not need to rely on what is, for us, a theoretical fantasy, 
namely the existence of a universal subject who, in a social vacuum, attempts to pin down the 
authentic nature of objects (and more particularly of persons) by relying solely on his/her 
cognitive abilities which predispose him/her to be an intuitive scientist. When people judge a 
person, they always consider this person in the social relationships which determine the social 
values which serve as reference to their judgment: this person is either a pupil or a worker or a 
teacher, or an artist… However, the dominant thinking in academic psychology well and truly 
considers the person judging (the teacher) and the judged person (the pupil) as if they were 
two homo sapiens sapiens. In fact, they never are homo sapiens sapiens but they are persons 
inserted into social situations involving roles and particular objectives. In brief, they are  actors 
or social agents. In addition, describing a homo sapiens sapiens is not the same as judging a 
social agent or actor. Recognizing that we evaluate actors or social agents and not human 
beings would lead to question important postulates of the research on the "personality”. 
Among these postulates, the most important, which is also the basis of what social 
psychologists have called the fundamental error, is that people always express their 
psychological nature to explain what they do. Accept the idea that they express especially their 
position of actor or social agent led to more concrete and less essentialist theoretical views. 
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